FWIW: http://safetycenter.navy.mil/media/approach/vault/articles/2004/0772.htmHoldback Fitting Failure by Lt. Adam J. Smith/FA-18
After four weeks of operations off the coast of Florida and in the Gulf of Mexico, the CVW-17/JFK team was almost complete with COMPTUEX. As anyone who has ever been involved in the normal CV workup cycle knows, most squadrons run a heavy schedule during COMPTUEX, and VFA-83 was no exception.
On 14 March 2004, our squadron had 23 sorties and 9 alerts scheduled. I was one of the lucky ones programmed for a 1.5-hour cycle DCA (day trap variety) with four hours of Alert-7 to follow. The flight brief was short and to the point. I was to fly with the squadron Operations Officer as his wingman. I walked to the jet and conducted my regular preflight inspection. The startup and subsequent taxi to the catapult were routine. What happened next was anything but ordinary.
I taxied onto catapult #3 in the usual fashion. Everything seemed normal as the aircraft entered the catapult track. The holdback fitting was attached, and I was armed up by the ordnancemen. The taxi director stood on my right side between the tower and the cat as he gave me the "take tension" sign. Following the control surface wipeout, I performed a last minute check of the flap and trim settings, the radalt bug and the beer cans (wing spread and locked indicators). With all of the take-off checks completed, I saluted the catapult officer.
As the Catapult Officer returned my salute, I positioned my left hand on the throttle and my right hand on the canopy bow handle (towel rack). Looking down the catapult track, I kept the green shirt that was going to press the catapult-firing button in my peripheral vision. I felt the holdback fitting release as the button was pushed; however, the sensation of the normal catapult acceleration was absent. I instantly knew that I had suffered either a "cold cat" or hold back fitting failure. Selecting ground idle with both throttles, I threw the arresting hook down and stood on the break pedals as if my life depended upon it. My Hornet stopped accelerating down the cat track, but it was still sliding towards the forward edge of the deck. In a final attempt to stop before pulling the ejection handle, I drove the right rudder pedal down in an effort to ground loop the aircraft. The jet rotated 90 degrees to the right and continued to skid down the angle. I was now staring straight at aircraft 310 on Cat #2 with both main mounts stuck in the greasy cat track offering no friction whatsoever. The aircraft finally came to rest with the port main mount a mere 15 ft from the deck edge, and I was looking at nothing but water under my left wingtip.
Although I had not initiated any communication with the tower during the entire incident, I did recall hearing someone transmit over tower frequency and say, "get the Hornet." It turned out this was the Skipper of our EA-6B squadron who was witnessing me slide forward on the LA.
Immediately after the incident, both the Ship's Safety Officer and the CAG Safety Officer took a vested interest in getting to the root cause of the narrowly averted mishap. As my squadron maintainers scrambled to examine the holdback fitting that is attached to the nose gear, the ship folks examined the holdback bar.
The F/A-18 uses what is called a "Repeatable Release Holdback Bar (RRHB)." These bars are taken to AIMD and inspected after every 100 traps to verify the integrity of the bar. The preliminary investigation report pointed to a failure of the RRHB that caused it to only partially reset in the deck plate and therefore fail during my launch. Subsequent investigations by the Air Division showed that the ship had more RHHBs in the same unsatisfactory condition. Since the incident, all of the RHHBs have been inspected, and the failed RHHBs have been replaced. In an additional measure, the "shooters" now incorporate a more stringent examination of the RHHB as part of their prelaunch checklist.
In conclusion, the normal safety procedures that F/A-18 aircrew have in place, including emergency procedures review before each and every flight, worked and kept me and aircraft 301 in one piece.
Lt. Smith flies with VFA-83.
